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Murphy’s Law: How to Avoid Going
Wrong with Federal Regulation of
Sports Gambling
ABSTRACT
Sports betting plays a major role in how fans and spectators enjoy
sports. Fans place bets in their living rooms, engage in online fantasy
sports, and travel to Nevada for massive Super Bowl parties just for the
thrill of wagering on the “big game.” Yet, until 2018, the federal
government banned sports betting, making states unable to exploit this
lucrative business, even though the sports betting industry estimates
that billions of dollars are spent on illegitimate sports wagering. With
the recent striking of the federal ban on the regulation of sports betting,
states have begun to benefit from sports betting within their own borders,
creating a patchwork of legislation that operators must navigate. But
state-specific legislation does not fully solve the problem of unregulated
and untaxed interstate gambling that is still bound to occur. To take
advantage of untaxed revenue and protect citizens who might otherwise
explore illegitimate and unsafe betting options, this Note argues the
federal government must enact comprehensive laws legalizing and
creating rules specifically for interstate sports betting operators.
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Twenty-six million people planned to bet $6.8 billion on
February 2020’s Super Bowl LIV.1 Only $154.7 million of this was
wagered in Nevada, the center of the sports betting world.2 What
happened to the other $6.6 billion? While some of it may have gone
through newly legalized frameworks in other states, the vast majority
was likely left unregulated and untaxed by federal and state
governments.3
The federal government is ignoring a massive amount of
potential revenue that could be realized through legalizing—and
taxing—interstate sports betting. Various legislators have introduced
bills, but none have gained traction in Washington, DC.4 Congress
1.
Super Bowl LIV Wagering Estimates, AM. GAMING ASS’N (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.americangaming.org/resources/super-bowl-liv-wagering-estimates/
[https://perma.cc/2WUH-Y5JF].
2.
Press Release, Nev. Gaming Control Bd., Super Bowl 2020, (Feb. 4, 2020), https://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=16539 [https://perma.cc/ZQT3-SBUV].
3.
See Super Bowl 2021: Guide to Legal US Sportsbooks, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 9,
2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting/super-bowl/ [https://perma.cc/4WH9JRNN] (estimating that only $325 million out of $6 billion of total bets were wagered legally for
Super Bowl LIII).
4.
See, e.g., Brett Smiley, Report: Romney To Carry Federal Sports Betting Bill Torch
With New York’s Schumer, SPORTS HANDLE (Sept. 6, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/romneyschumer-sports-betting-federal-bill-report/ [https://perma.cc/G7WY-FPN8]; Sports Wagering
Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong.
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likely fears treading into the same waters it sunk in with the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which
banned all sports betting with few exceptions.5 In May 2018, the
Supreme Court struck down this federal ban.6 In the wake of that
decision, eighteen states now have some form of legalized and regulated
sports betting, with six extremely close to launching similar laws.7
Sports gambling laws vary widely from state to state,8 causing concern
with professional sports leagues,9 professional sports players’
associations,10 and some governmental figures.11 These entities all have
shown support for a new federal law to patch some of the holes that
PASPA12 left. However, in enacting any new legislation, lawmakers
must avoid the same constitutional problems that faced PASPA.
This Note argues that a new federal statute should be
established that exclusively governs interstate sports betting operators.
Part I discusses how sports gambling has been historically regulated
through the Wire Act13 and PASPA.14 It then reviews the eventual
downfall of PASPA in the Supreme Court.15 Part I continues with the
leagues’, the states’, and the federal government’s reactions to Murphy
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the case that struck down PASPA.
Part II explores the benefits and potential market effects of a new
federal framework for sports betting versus state-specific legislation.
Part III concludes that a new federal statute focused solely on interstate
5.
See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, § 2(a), 106
Stat. 4227 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2018)), invalidated by Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
6.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.
7.
See Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/LT3F-9973].
8.
Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every
State Stands, ESPN (June 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-unitedstates-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/J6LU-SSQQ].
9.
Brett Smiley, Exclusive: Here’s the ‘Model’ Sports Betting Playbook From NBA, MLB,
SPORTS HANDLE (Feb. 20, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-nba-mlb-model-act-integrity-fee/ [https://perma.cc/XR48-Z6WW].
10.
Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing Before Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. 24–25 (2018) (testimony of the NFL Players Association, MLB Players Association, NHL
Players Association, NBA Players Association, and Major League Soccer Players Association).
11.
Smiley, supra note 4.
12.
See Wayne Parry, Feds Eye Move to Regulate Legal Sports Betting, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://apnews.com/a3e2b43f3931436e8156f54471ad5fc3 [https://perma.cc/78ZHT4LM].
13.
See Interstate Wire Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491 (1961) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2018)).
14.
See 28 U.S.C. § 3702.
15.
See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.
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sports betting platforms should be implemented to supplement the
growing patchwork of state sports betting laws.
I. THE LEGISLATION BANNING SPORTS BETTING AND ITS (PARTIAL)
DOWNFALL
A. Legislation and Case Law History
Sports betting in the United States has a long history of both
legislation and case law. First, the Wire Act was implemented to
prohibit all variations of interstate gambling.16 While the Wire Act
sufficiently targeted organized crime, legislators and sports leagues
decided that better tailored legislation was necessary for sports
betting; they enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (PASPA) in 1992.17 PASPA prohibited state-sponsored sports
betting schemes, and New Jersey eventually challenged the Act as
unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine.18 After
multiple challenges by New Jersey, the Supreme Court ruled that
PASPA was, in fact, unconstitutional and struck down the entirety of
the statute.19 This Section analyzes the necessity of PASPA, its
enactment, and its eventual downfall in the Supreme Court.
1. The Wire Act
The Interstate Wire Act of 1961 clearly prohibits interstate
sports gambling.20 Congress passed the Wire Act to assist states in
enforcing their own gambling laws and to stifle organized interstate
gambling activities.21 US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
introduced the Wire Act with the primary goal of taking away mafia
organizations’ most profitable revenue stream: bookkeeping.22 The Act
16.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
17.
See What Is PASPA? The Professional Amateur Sports Protection Act, THE LINES (May
25, 2018), https://www.thelines.com/betting/paspa/ [https://perma.cc/TT45-TPQL]; Keith Pickard,
Crossed Wires: How the Wrangling Over the Wire Act is Shaping Policy in Sports Betting, NEV.
LAW.,
June
2020,
at
8,
9,
https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/NevadaLawyer_June2020_CrossedWires-WireAct.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYN9-432P].
18.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1466.
19.
Id. at 1465–66.
20.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a); see N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136
(D.N.H. 2019).
21.
Daniel L. Wallach, The “Shifting Line” of Sports Betting Legalization, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF AM. SPORTS L. 297, 299 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018).
22.
Michelle Minton, The Original Intent of the Wire Act and Its Implications for
State-based Legalization of Internet Gambling, in 29 CTR. FOR GAMING RSCH. OCCASIONAL PAPER
SERIES 1, 1 (D. Schwartz ed., 2014).
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criminalizes anyone “engaged in the business of betting,” offering, or
taking bets through the use of wired devices from gamblers in other
states.23 For someone to be “engaged in the business of betting,” all the
government must prove is that the accused “participated in a regular
course of conduct or series of transactions” that was dedicated to
profiting from betting.24 A more general term for someone covered
under the Act would be a “bookie.”25 The Wire Act has evolved with
technology, with courts finding that it encompasses the internet (and
therefore cell phones and assumedly phone applications) as a “wire
communication facility.”26
The Wire Act includes a safe harbor that permits the
transmission of information that assists the placing of bets between
states where betting on sports is legal.27 The safe harbor is only
available when sports betting is legal in both the “sending” jurisdiction
and the “receiving” jurisdiction; one alone is not sufficient.28
Additionally, the safe harbor is limited to the transmission of
information assisting bets (such as instructions on how to place a bet),
not the bets themselves.29 One final limitation to the safe harbor is that
it does not apply to the individuals placing the bet; rather, it only
applies to those in the business of betting.30 Courts have not expanded
this language to individual gamblers, regardless of their betting
habits.31
2. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA)
Legislators and sports leagues, concerned about the particular
harms of widespread sports betting, were not satisfied with relying on
an act designed to target organized crime. Spurred by concerns over
match fixing, America’s youth having access to sports betting and
becoming compulsive gamblers, and public confidence in sporting
events, former National Basketball Association (NBA) player Bill
23.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
24.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 300 (citing United States v. Rozenfeld, No. 13 Cr. 268, 2014
WL 917057, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2014)).
25.
Id. at 299.
26.
Id. at 300 (citing United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 716 (1st Cir. 2014); United
States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2001)).
27.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
28.
See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2001).
29.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
30.
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
31.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 301–02 (citing United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428,
436 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d on other
grounds; United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983)).
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Bradley introduced PASPA on February 22, 1991.32 Bradley had
support from the commissioners of the NBA, National Football League
(NFL), and Major League Baseball (MLB); the leagues supported the
curbing of sports gambling in order to protect the integrity of sporting
events.33 Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Report expressed major
concern with sports gambling as “a national problem” that inflicted
harms “beyond the borders of those States that sanction it.”34 While the
Wire Act did (and still does) prohibit interstate sports gambling, PASPA
went further, making it illegal for any state to sanction intrastate
sports gambling schemes.35
In 1992, barely a year after its introduction, PASPA was passed
and went into effect on January 1, 1993.36 PASPA prohibited all
state-run sports gambling schemes with narrow carveouts
grandfathering in Nevada and other states that had already established
sports gambling lotteries or schemes.37 Additionally, it provided a
“grace period” of one year to New Jersey and other states with
previously legalized casino gambling to legalize sports gambling before
being subjected to the federal ban.38 However, New Jersey became
subject to PASPA’s ban as it was unable to form a sports gambling
scheme in time.39
State and private actors were the targets of the ban, but private
actors were only subject to PASPA if they acted “pursuant to the law”
of a state.40 This emphasized the statute’s targeting of state-sponsored
sports gambling.41 To enforce this, PASPA empowered the Attorney
General of the United States to seek injunctions in federal district court
against violators of PASPA. Additionally, PASPA provided both
professional and amateur sports organizations a cause of action to seek
an injunction if the organization’s “competitive game[s] [were] alleged
to be the basis of such violation.”42 For example, the National Hockey
32.
S. REP. NO. 102-248 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3554–56; What Is
PASPA?, supra note 17; see also Wallach, supra note 21, at 302.
33.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3554; What Is PASPA?, supra note 17.
34.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3556.
35.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 299, 302.
36.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3555; Hunter M. Haines, Note and Comment, Passing the Ball:
The United States Supreme Court Strikes Down PASPA and Throws Sports Gambling Back to
State Legislatures, 78 MD. L. REV. 604, 609 (2019).
37.
28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1)–(2); Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287 (2011).
38.
§ 3704(a)(3); Wallach, supra note 21, at 307.
39.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 307.
40.
Id. at 303; § 3702(2).
41.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3553, 3555; see also Wallach, supra note 21, at 302–03.
42.
§ 3703; Wallach, supra note 21, at 304.
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League (NHL) could seek an injunction against Florida if the state
legalized sports betting on NHL games, but the NHL would not have
standing to block any wagering on MLB or NFL games. Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the case invalidating PASPA, is an extreme
example of sports leagues joining together to sue a governing body, New
Jersey, for legalizing sports betting.43
3. Murphy v. United States
Despite having missed its chance in 1993 to legalize sports
betting, New Jersey amended its state constitution in 2011 to allow the
state legislature to license sports gambling at particular locations.44
New Jersey needed state funds after the 2008 financial crisis and was
wary of the underground sports betting industry flourishing in casino
towns, such as Atlantic City.45 Following that amendment, Governor
Chris Christie signed the Sports Wagering Law in January 2012.46 The
Sports Wagering Law permitted sports betting in casinos and
racetracks, taking advantage of already available gaming
infrastructure.47
Unfortunately for New Jersey, four professional sports leagues
joined the NCAA in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of
New Jersey in suing New Jersey under PASPA before the state was able
to issue any licenses.48 In the first of multiple rounds of litigation, the
sports leagues successfully convinced the court that, under PASPA,
New Jersey could not sanction sports betting.49 New Jersey’s argument
that the statute violated the anti-commandeering doctrine was
fruitless.50 This constitutional doctrine prohibits the federal
government from “commandeering” state governments; essentially, the
federal government may not impose “targeted, affirmative, coercive
duties” on state legislators.51 On appeal, New Jersey argued that
PASPA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine by forcing the states
to not regulate sports gambling, reasoning that if the state repealed any
ban or regulations, they could be found to have “authorized” sports

43.
See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
44.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 307–08.
45.
See id. at 308.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 309.
49.
Id.
50.
See id.
51.
Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001).

168

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:1:161

gambling.52 The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied New
Jersey’s appeal.53 The court found that “it is hard to see how Congress
can ‘commandeer’ a state, or how it can be found to regulate how a state
regulates, if it does not require it do anything at all.”54 The majority did
not accept New Jersey’s argument, upholding PASPA as
constitutional.55
After losing its appeal in the Third Circuit, New Jersey filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.56 In opposing
Supreme Court review, the federal government argued that “PASPA
does not even obligate New Jersey to leave in place the state-law
prohibitions against sports gambling that it had chosen to adopt prior
to PASPA’s enactment. To the contrary, New Jersey is free to repeal
those prohibitions in whole or in part.”57 The Supreme Court silently
agreed, denying New Jersey’s petition for review of this decision.58
New Jersey capitalized on the government’s suggestion in
October 2014 by partially repealing its sports betting laws in what is
known as the “2014 Act.”59 The 2014 Act expressly states “that it is not
to be interpreted as causing the State to authorize, license, sponsor,
operate, advertise, or promote sports gambling.”60 Rather, it repealed
state-law provisions that prohibited sports gambling regarding
wagering by anyone twenty-one years or older at a horseracing track,
casino, or gambling casino in Atlantic City (remarkably similar
locations to the 2012 Sports Wagering Law).61 The repeal did not apply
to wagers on New Jersey college teams or collegiate events within the
state.62 Once again, in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, the
sports leagues used their standing under PASPA to sue New Jersey,

52.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 310.
53.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter Christie I].
54.
Id. at 231.
55.
Id. at 232 (“Nothing in [PASPA’s] words requires that the states keep any law in place.
All that is prohibited is the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the affirmative ‘authoriz[ation] by
law’ of gambling schemes.”) This decision may have been spurred by the majority’s note that the
Supreme Court has only twice invalidated a federal law under the anti-commandeering doctrine.
See id. at 227.
56.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Christie I, 573 U.S. 931 (2014) (No. 13–967).
57.
Brief for United States in Opposition at 11, Christie I, 573 U.S. 931 (2014) (No.
13–967).
58.
Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 931 (2014).
59.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 311–12.
60.
The 2014 Act, 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 62.
61.
See id.
62.
Id.
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alleging this time that the repeal was a circumvention of PASPA.63 For
the second time, the Third Circuit heard the appeal after New Jersey
was once again unsuccessful in the district court; it held that the repeal
amounted to an authorization and there was no violation of the
anti-commandeering doctrine.64 This time, the Supreme Court found
the constitutional debate significant enough to grant certiorari.65
New Jersey’s long journey finally ended with a victory when the
Supreme Court held that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering
doctrine.66 The majority found that the federal government’s distinction
between affirmative command and preclusive actions was “empty.”67
Rather, whether affirmative or preclusive, Congress is essentially in
direct control of state legislatures.68 The Court reasoned that “[a] more
direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”69 The entirety
of PASPA was thus struck down as unconstitutional, opening the doors
for state-sponsored sports betting.70 The Court closed by stating that
Congress may still regulate sports gambling directly (albeit in a more
constitutional manner). However, if it chose not to do so, “each State is
free to act on its own.”71 This final statement foreshadowed the barrage
of legislation states would enact less than two years after the Murphy
decision in order to profit from this new revenue stream.72
B. Responses to the End of PASPA
1. State Responses
Unsurprisingly, New Jersey was the first state to legalize sports
betting after the demise of PASPA.73 Following its lead, fourteen other
states now have legalized and regulated sports gambling.74 Some have
realized financial success from regulating and taxing the activity. For

63.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 506 (D.N.J. 2014)
[hereinafter Christie II].
64.
Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 396–97, 402 (3d Cir. 2016).
65.
See Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2018) (mem.).
66.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 1482, 1484–85.
71.
Id. at 1484–85.
72.
Legislative Tracker, supra note 7.
73.
Brent Johnson, Phil Murphy Signs N.J. Sports Betting Law. You Can Start Betting on
Thursday,
NJ.COM
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.nj.com/politics/2018/06/sports_betting_to_begin_in_nj_after_phil_murphy_si.html [https://perma.cc/VW8Y-HT74].
74.
See Legislative Tracker, supra note 7.
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example, New Jersey implemented an online sports betting regime and
quickly became the largest market for regulated online gambling in the
United States, beating out Nevada for the top spot.75 Mississippi was
the first southern state to partake in the action, but with a twist: the
state allows sports betting operations on casino property, but only
allows mobile wagering if one is located on that same property.76 Even
with the odd restrictions on mobile wagering, Mississippi still
experienced relative success with $6.2 million in revenue from the
sportsbooks in November 2018.77
However, revenue numbers through December 2019—almost a
full year and a half since states could capitalize on sports betting—show
varying levels of financial success. For example, New Jersey quickly
adopted a comprehensive scheme allowing sports betting in casinos, at
racetracks, and online from anywhere in the state.78 Giving citizens a
variety of options and legal opportunities to place bets has led to New
Jersey netting $47,761,913 from June 2018 to December 2019.79
Compare that with New York, which took a year longer to enact sports
betting legislation.80 New York, unlike New Jersey, requires that bets
be placed in-person, rather than on phones or other devices.81
Additionally, New York followed New Jersey in prohibiting bets on
in-state college teams.82 Partly due to the delay, but more significantly
due to its refusal to allow mobile gambling, New York’s 10 percent
sports-gaming tax has only netted the state $700,000 as of December
2019.83
This illustration suggests that a state cannot be guaranteed a
steady revenue stream from sports betting if it is unwilling to be flexible
with how it allows its citizens to participate in sports betting.

75.
Ben Burd, The Biggest Sports Betting States in 2019, SPORTS ECONOMIST (Feb. 6,
2020),
https://thesportseconomist.com/2019/09/04/the-biggest-sports-betting-states-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/9K2U-WV9K].
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
See Act of June 11, 2018, 2018 N.J. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 33, codified at N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 5:12A-10 to -19.
79.
See Jon Chrisos, Sports Betting Is Illegal in Maine. Here’s How Much Other States Are
Making in Tax Revenue, WGME (Feb. 3, 2020), https://wgme.com/news/i-team/sports-betting-isillegal-in-maine-heres-how-much-other-states-are-making-in-tax-revenue
[https://perma.cc/99MU-9YWX].
80.
Don Cazentre, Why Is New York Lagging Behind in Sports Betting Revenues?, N.Y.
UPSTATE (Nov. 12, 2019) https://www.newyorkupstate.com/casinos/2019/11/why-is-new-york-lagging-behind-in-sports-betting-revenues.html [https://perma.cc/GN9U-MT39].
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.; Chrisos, supra note 79.
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2. League Responses
At first, professional sports leagues lobbied the government for
the ability to opt their teams out of legalized gambling.84 Clearly, states
did not approve of this approach; it verged too closely to the enforcement
power the leagues enjoyed under PASPA. As a result, the leagues
developed a different approach—lobbying for “integrity fees.”85
Integrity fees are essentially taxes on sports betting that benefit the
leagues at the expense of sportsbooks and other betting operators.86
Leagues started their request for these fees at 1 percent of sportsbook
revenues.87 Upon realizing that the state-sponsored sportsbooks would
fight against losing what would be 20 percent of their revenue under
the 1 percent fee, leagues dropped their expectation to 0.25 percent.88
As states refused to incorporate integrity fees into their sports
betting legislation, the quest for integrity fees faded. The leagues
instead turned to a third plan of attack—mandated use of official league
data.89 Both Tennessee and Illinois included such a requirement in
their sports betting bills.90 Requiring official league data means that
sportsbooks must purchase their data straight from the leagues or their
affiliates; in effect, this provides leagues with the opportunity to
monetize their own data.91 States that have not yet finalized their
sports betting schemes may be more amenable to this option rather
than allowing leagues to opt-out or giving them an integrity fee; this
compromise provides state sportsbooks with potentially faster data.92
However, some states may not be persuaded that the speed is
necessary; Nevada, the golden child of legalized sports betting, has
never mandated the use of official league data, and its sportsbooks have

84.
Bill King, Gaming Industry, Leagues Differ on Integrity Guards, S PORTS BUS. J. (Apr.
16, 2018), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/04/16/World-Congress-ofSports/Integrity.aspx [https://perma.cc/J2FQ-TN8M].
85.
Matt Bonesteel, Sports Gambling ‘Integrity Fee’ Supporters Are Not Doing Themselves
Any Favors, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/earlylead/wp/2018/05/22/sports-gambling-integrity-fee-supporters-are-not-doing-themselves-any-favors/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/MF2R-6FBA]; Sports Betting Integrity Fee, LEGAL SPORTS
REP. (May 15, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/integrity-fee/ [https://perma.cc/Y7GGSGJ7].
86.
Sports Betting Integrity Fee, supra note 85.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/official-league-data/ [https://perma.cc/GHY5-GJLU].
90.
See id.
91.
See id.
92.
See id.
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not had any discernible issues with a few seconds delay in receiving
game data.93
3. Federal Responses
During the arguments regarding PASPA’s constitutionality in
front of the Supreme Court, New Jersey Congressman Frank Pallone
proposed the Gaming Accountability and Modernization Enhancement
(GAME) Act.94 Pallone designed the bill to repeal PASPA and create a
minimum amount of consumer safeguards that focused on many of the
same goals of PASPA, such as integrity and underage gambling, along
with financial goals such as licensing and taxation.95 It also was
supposed to include ways to verify age and location, privacy and data
security precautions, and “recourse mechanisms for consumers.”96
While the GAME Act was designed to give states the final say in
legalization, it conditioned allowance of a state framework and
involvement in interstate gaming on federal oversight. However, due to
New Jersey’s success in self-regulating its sports gambling and what
appeared to be professional sports leagues’ opportunism, Pallone
withdrew his bill on September 12, 2018.97
The next proposed sports betting bill developed at the end of
2018—the Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act (SWMIA). This bill is
the brainchild of Senators Orrin Hatch and Chuck Schumer.98 It
includes a provision requiring attorney general approval of proposed
state-sponsored sports gambling programs, lists prohibited bettors,
mandates the use of official data, institutes a national clearinghouse,
and outlines more provisions related to responsible gambling and
consumer safety.99 SWMIA is still making its way through Congress,
with Mitt Romney taking over Senator Hatch’s position as Schumer’s

93.
See id.
94.
Press Release, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone Introduces GAME Act on Day
Supreme Court Hears Arguments in New Jersey’s Sports Betting Case (Dec. 7, 2017), https://pallone.house.gov/press-release/pallone-introduces-game-act-day-supreme-court-hears-argumentsnew-jersey%E2%80%99s-sports [https://perma.cc/2FGD-TRQ8] [hereinafter Congressman Pallone
Release].
95.
Wallach, supra note 21, at 323.
96.
Congressman Pallone Release, supra note 94.
97.
Bart Shirley, Rep. Frank Pallone Retracts Game Act Federal Sports Betting Bill, PLAY
USA
(Sept.
17,
2018),
https://www.playusa.com/frank-pallone-sports-betting-bill/
[https://perma.cc/9USJ-22SS].
98.
See Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. (2018).
99.
John Holden, Instant Expert Legal Analysis of the Federal Sports Betting Bill – Part
1, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26953/federal-sportsbetting-bill-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/982E-PSUS].
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partner.100 As expected, public and congressional opinions on the
legislation are varied. Some believe SWMIA is destined for failure in a
divided Congress; others suggest it could be the beginning of a
necessary federal framework, be it expansive or narrow.101
II. CONSIDERING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL VERSUS STATE
REGULATION OF SPORTS BETTING
As more states regulate sports betting within their borders, a
varied patchwork of legislation will likely become burdensome on the
sports betting industry. Regulators and the leagues—acting as
lobbyists—now must decide whether the burden of fifty different
frameworks is better or worse than a new federal framework. A new
federal framework will likely produce a variety of benefits, including
promoting uniformity, creating minimum standards for industry
members to follow, enhancing reliability with official data mandates,
increasing enforcement for illegal interstate betting operations, and
maintaining the integrity of sporting events. These benefits have both
positive and negative market realities. The positive effects include
creating better liquidity in the sports betting market, allowing more
consumer choice, and arguably permitting steeper penalties for match
fixing. Negative effects, on the other hand, include encouraging offshore
betting and creating more opportunities for bad actors to engage in
match fixing, despite the steeper penalties.
A. Benefits of Federal Regulation
A federal framework for sports betting, however minimal or
expansive, is bound to have a multitude of benefits. The primary
tangible gains of a federal framework include uniformity and reliability
of governing structures as well as the integrity of games.102 A federal
framework will likely benefit the leagues, bettors, sportsbooks, and
lawmakers; but these stakeholders should be wary that an overbroad
federal framework may encounter constitutional and legal pitfalls that

100.
Smiley, supra note 4.
101.
Compare Mitt Romney Working on New Federal Sports Betting Bill, SPORTSBOOK REV.
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.sportsbookreview.com/news/mitt-romney-working-on-new-federalsports-betting-bill-85410/ [https://perma.cc/9CDU-T2XM], with Jeremy Maltby, Irwin Raij, Laurel
L. Rimon & Alexander Chester, Federal Sports Betting Proposals: The Sports Wagering Market
Integrity Act of 2018, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/federal-sports-betting-proposals/ [https://perma.cc/32BX78SQ].
102.
See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3556 (1992).
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could threaten its viability. Thus, enacting a federal framework for
sports betting must be deftly crafted and carefully implemented.
1. Uniformity
Uniformity in legalization and regulation of sports betting is an
important benefit for the leagues and any sportsbooks looking to expand
into other states.103 Consistent licensing, compliance, and reporting
requirements would allow ease of operation.104 Nonuniform laws across
all fifty states create a myriad of inefficiencies.105 Conversely, an
interstate law in addition to overruling the Wire Act (as proposed by
SWMIA) would create an opportunity for interstate wagering to occur.
Yet, to obtain uniformity, a federal law could face a major
anti-commandeering issue similar to the one that plagued PASPA.106
Specifically, because a federal law setting requirements for state
licensing schemes could “compel the States to require or prohibit [acts
by private actors],” it might violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.
As a result, obtaining federally imposed uniformity by requiring state
action could be constitutionally tricky.107 Additionally, even if there is
no constitutional issue, the individual states might be better equipped
to regulate their own markets because an overarching federal law
would not be tailored to state-specific market realities.108
2. Minimum Standards
To accomplish some form of uniformity, a federal law may
attempt to establish minimum standards. For instance, rather than
provide an overarching, detailed scheme for the states, a federal law
may establish set penalties for match fixing or other sports
betting-related crimes for the private actors. Regulating the minimum
might be a better way to skirt the anti-commandeering doctrine,
especially if the law concentrates on private actors engaged in
interstate commerce, rather than imposing requirements on the states.
In doing so, the federal government could not be accused of forcing the
states to act. However, these minimum standards might already have
103.
See id.
104.
Jennifer Roberts & Greg Gemignani, Who Wore It Better? Federal v. State Government
Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 UNLV GAMING L.J. 77, 88 (2019).
105.
Keith C. Miller & Anthony N. Cabot, Regulatory Models for Sports Wagering: The
Debate Between State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153, 159–60 (2018).
106.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977).
107.
See JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10133, THE SUPREME COURT BETS AGAINST
COMMANDEERING: MURPHY V. NCAA, SPORTS GAMBLING, AND FEDERALISM 2 (2018).
108.
Roberts & Gemignani, supra note 104, at 88.
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been enacted by some states;109 consequently, a federal law would be a
waste of resources.110
Despite these drawbacks, the majority of states are new to sports
gambling. Therefore, federal guidance that incorporates voices from all
interested parties could be beneficial. But, any federal scheme, even one
with nominal requirements, runs the risk of being seen as too
heavy-handed under the anti-commandeering doctrine.111 Regardless of
these anti-commandeering concerns, Congress appears to have the
Supreme Court’s blessing, through Murphy, to enact federal regulation
pertaining to individuals engaged in interstate sports betting.112 Thus,
congressional enactment of minimum standards partnered with a
paring back of the Wire Act113 may stimulate new business and
economic benefits.
3. Official Data
As discussed in Part I,114 an official data mandate is extremely
desirable for the leagues in both state and potential federal legislation.
The legislators’ reasoning put forth for official league data in a federal
framework mirrors that of states: if the information comes from the
league itself (or its official data-collecting partner), it is going to be
consistent and fair.115 But, as previously discussed, Nevada’s history of
using “unofficial” data seems to undercut this reasoning, as its
sportsbooks have had tremendous success without any substantial
delays in obtaining real-time data.116 It is yet to be seen if this unofficial
data will remain both fair, consistent, and fast on a larger scale as
sports betting becomes more prolific, even if only permitted intrastate.
Additionally, there may be constitutional concerns with this mandate.
Some commenters have argued that a First Amendment issue may
arise if the federal government were to pursue this option.117

109.
Id. at 89.
110.
See id.
111.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
112.
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476–77 (2018); Douglas L.
McSwain, The Legalization of Sports Betting: A Federalism Framework and the Horse Racing
Model, 11 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 63, 63 (2019).
113.
See infra Sections II.B.2, III.B.
114.
See supra Section I.A.2.
115.
Roberts & Gemignani, supra note 104, at 93.
116.
Official League Data, supra note 89.
117.
See Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden & Asa D. Brown, Real-Time Sports Data and
the First Amendment, WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 96–101 (suggesting that while the leagues may
have a pecuniary interest in their data, a restriction on an individual’s right to disseminate
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Perhaps the biggest potential issue with an official data
mandate is the threat of an antitrust violation. States that impose this
requirement create a natural monopoly for each league in its own
data; in turn, leagues might be challenged under the Sherman
Antitrust Act.118 The league’s immediate defense under an antitrust
violation for an official league data mandate would be the state action
doctrine.119 The state action doctrine first protects against the challenge
of any anticompetitive action by the state itself.120 Here, arguably the
state itself is not acting anticompetitively; rather, it seems to be
commanding corporate activity and transactions.121
In Tennessee—one of the states mandating official league
data—the state action doctrine is on shaky ground, according to
Tennessee attorney Alex Hall.122 Since the state itself is not acting, the
standards in Tennessee are that “the requirement must be one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and also
“actively supervised by the state itself.”123 Hall argues that neither of
these requirements are met because, first, there is no reflection of policy
regarding official data and, second, leaving cooperation to private
negotiation “demonstrates a lack of state supervision.”124
While the pitfalls of official league data and antitrust concerns
may deserve a more thorough discussion, it is important to note that
legislators and leagues must be aware of this threat when considering
an official data mandate.
4. Enforcement
Enforcement has been a concern since before PASPA was
dismantled.125 Any regulatory authority, whether a new governmental
information occurring in publicly funded arenas could violate the First Amendment); Official
League Data, supra note 89.
118.
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–2 (West) (The Sherman Act creates steep penalties for
anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conduct that monopolizes a market).
119.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (“The Sherman Act makes no mention of
the state as such and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action
directed by a state.”).
120.
Id.
121.
Brett Smiley, Does Tennessee’s Sports Betting Data Mandate Enjoy Antitrust
Immunity?, SPORTS HANDLE (June 10, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/tennessee-sports-bettingdata-mandate-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/RA5D-FMFE].
122.
Id.
123.
Id.; City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
124.
Smiley, supra note 121.
125.
Christopher Polisano, Betting Against PASPA: Why the Federal Restrictions on Sports
Gambling Are Unconstitutional and How They Hurt the States, Comment, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 453, 479 (2018) (“Increased transparency from legalization would allow law
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entity or a delegation to an existing agency, will clearly have the ability
to enforce illegal interstate sports betting.126 Additionally, SWMIA
suggests that the Attorney General should have the power to bring
actions against offshore sports betting websites.127
Jennifer Roberts, previously Director of Sports Gaming
Regulation for the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation, and Greg
Gemignani, a gaming law expert and instructor at the International
Center for Gaming Regulation at University of Nevada, Las Vegas
School of Law, suggest that the resources brought in through taxation
might lead to increased enforcement.128 Taxation, as evidenced by the
various states’ successes, will likely be lucrative for the federal
government, but it alone may not be the catalyst for increased
enforcement.129 More likely than not, enforcement will be the
consequence of lobbying by sports leagues that are opposed to
sacrificing the integrity of their games.130
5. Integrity
As mentioned in Section I.B.2,131 the leagues are unlikely to win
any battle for integrity fees. However, sports’ history of match fixing
and gambling-based corruption132 might motivate the government to
investigate and enforce any issues coming out of the leagues
themselves.
Additionally, the integrity of US sports leagues may not be at as
much of a risk as our history may make us believe. Dr. Declan Hill, an
academic expert on match fixing, asserts that there are three conditions
that foster match fixing: 1) vast illegal gambling markets, 2) poor wages
paid to players and referees, and 3) a perception that the league in
question is corrupt.133

enforcement to focus more resources on other important areas of concern. According to one former
FBI Director, ‘a regulated market combined with modern data analytics technology makes it easier
to track sports wagering, identify suspicious and anomalous betting patterns, and strengthen the
integrity of games.’”).
126.
See, e.g., Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 105.
127.
Id. § 301(f).
128.
Roberts & Gemignani, supra note 104, at 90.
129.
Miller & Cabot, supra note 105, at 171.
130.
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3556 (1992).
131.
See infra Section II.B.2.
132.
See, e.g., William F. Lamb, The Black Sox Scandal, SOC’Y AM. BASEBALL RES. (2015),
https://sabr.org/research/black-sox-scandal-bill-lamb [https://perma.cc/VR58-VXDC].
133.
See Declan Hill, A Critical Mass of Corruption: Why Some Football Leagues Have More
Match-Fixing than Others, 11 INT’L J. SPORTS MKTG. & SPONSORSHIP 221, 226–29 (2010).
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As for the first factor, vast illegal gambling markets, those
vouching for new federal sports gambling legislation believe that these
exist in the United States.134 Even those who believe that state
legislation will swallow up illegitimate gambling cannot argue with the
black-market valuations. For example, the American Gaming
Association has estimated that up to $150 billion per year is illegally
bet on sports.135
The second factor, poor wages, is only of concern in the NCAA.
As of 2016, the NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL all paid their players, on
average, between $2 million and $6 million.136 Even the MLS had an
average salary of just over $300,000 at the time.137 NCAA
student-athletes, on the other hand, have no opportunity to make
money during college through their athletic efforts.138 Some of these
athletes may be particularly susceptible to the chance to earn some
money for a missed free throw or field goal. New Jersey’s own law
appears to acknowledge this concern by not allowing bets on in-state
collegiate sport or athletic events.139
Finally, the third factor, perception, is particularly subjective in
US sports. While history suggests there is a risk of illegitimacy in
games,140 most do not believe any games are fixed for gambling
purposes; rather, outrage is more often directed at leagues playing

134.
135.

S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3566.
Elaine S. Povich, Show Me the Money: Sports Betting Off and Running, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/09/10/show-me-the-money-sports-betting-off-and-running
[https://perma.cc/4KYY-3KEL].
136.
Kurt Badenhausen, The Average Player Salary and Highest-Paid in NBA, MLB, NHL,
NFL and MLS, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2016, 9:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2016/12/15/average-player-salaries-in-major-american-sports-leagues/#6adb92d61050
[https://perma.cc/THD5-9GCN].
137.
Id.
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John Holden, Match Fixing and Other Manipulations in Sports Betting: A Primer,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20922/match-fixing-primersports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/CBX8-36RY].
139.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12A-10 (West 2018) (“‘[P]rohibited sports event’ means any
collegiate sport or athletic event that takes place in New Jersey or a sport or athletic event in
which any New Jersey college team participates regardless of where the event takes place. A
‘prohibited sports event’ does not include the other games of a collegiate sport or athletic
tournament in which a New Jersey college team participates, nor does it include any games of a
collegiate tournament that occurs outside New Jersey even though some of the individual games
or events are held in New Jersey. A prohibited sports event includes all high school sports events,
electronic sports, and competitive video games but does not include international sports events in
which persons under age 18 make up a minority of the participants.”); see also Caitlin D. Buckstaff,
Note, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism and Vulnerability of Student-Athlete’s
in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L., 133, 153 (2013).
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See, e.g., Holden, supra note 138.
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favorites towards money-making teams.141 Overall, integrity is one of
the primary reasons for implementing federal legislation and appears
to be interwoven into many of the other factors. Integrity concerns,
however, are also based on speculation and biases regarding the
socioeconomic statuses of athletes and others involved in sports. Thus,
while integrity should be considered and protected, especially in the
NCAA, it may not be as pressing of an issue as legislators and sports
leagues believe.
B. Market Realities
A federal framework for sports betting will affect more than the
game itself. Some ramifications of a federal framework, such as better
market liquidity and more consumer choice, are a societal positive. But
more sinister consequences loom, such as driving more betting into
underground markets and incentivizing match fixing. As with any law,
these realities must be considered, and the trade-offs must be weighed
carefully.
1. Incentivizing Offshore Betting
Offshore betting may become an issue if wider regulation
ensues. Sara Slane, the prior Senior VP of Public Affairs for the
American Gaming Association, testified before a House subcommittee
that “unnecessary regulations will only allow illegal offshore
sportsbooks to thrive.”142 While potentially counterintuitive, this
argument is not without merit. The underground sports betting market
flourished during the existence of PASPA143 because people enjoy sports
betting and had no other way to engage in it. Now, as sports betting
becomes even more prolific due to daily fantasy sports, individuals are
looking for more ways to engage with a league or a specific team. For
example, people who want to place a bet on which NFL team will win
the Super Bowl will be forced to do so illegitimately if their state has
chosen not to support sports betting.

141.
See, e.g., Zach Lucini, This Guy Thinks All Pro Sports Are Rigged, V ICE (Dec. 20, 2013),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5gkbgq/this-guy-thinks-all-pro-sports-are-rigged-0000165v20n12 [https://perma.cc/45WA-KQRX].
142.
Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America, supra note 10, at 11
(testimony of Sara Slane).
143.
See Povich, supra note 135.
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While not all fans engage with their favorite sports in this way,
many do, with market valuations suggesting that the trend will grow.144
Those in favor of leaving sports betting oversight up to the states believe
that this is enough; however, there is a large untapped market for
interstate sports betting that will remain unregulated and potentially
unsafe for individuals’ privacy and assets. Individuals who reside in
states without a betting framework likely will still seek an option to
wager on games, and a regulated interstate framework may capitalize
on this money, which would otherwise go untaxed. Nevertheless, as
Sara Slane suggested, regulating too heavily may deter market entry
and potentially cause sportsbooks to move offshore.145
2. Better Market Liquidity If the Wire Act Is Updated
If the Wire Act was modified, as suggested by SWMIA,146 there
is a strong potential for better market liquidity because sports gambling
companies could operate across state lines. With this option, there
might be more access to sports gambling for those not in states that
have chosen to legalize it, minimizing the concern of offshore betting by
replacing it with federally regulated options. SWMIA suggests that only
interstate bets pursuant to an “interstate sports wagering compact”
would be permitted.147 This requirement likely eases some enforcement
burdens. It may also alleviate the concern that an individual located in
a state where sports betting is illegal who places a bet through a website
hosted in a state where sports betting is legal would be charged with a
felony under the Travel Act and Unlawful Internet Gaming
Enforcement Act.148
As it currently stands, the Wire Act seems to be the single most
formidable barrier to interstate sports gambling.149 Some speculate
regarding the Supreme Court’s language in Murphy addressing the
144.
Sports Betting Market Expected to Reach $8 Billion by 2025, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 4,
2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/firms-say-sports-betting-market-to-reach-8billion-by-2025-2019-11-04 [https://perma.cc/F3R7-4SVA].
145.
See Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America, supra note 10, at 11
(testimony of Sara Slane).
146.
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. § 301.
147.
Id. § 105(a) (“Each sports wagering opt-in State may enter into such interstate sports
wagering compact as may be necessary to provide for sports wagering on an interactive sports
wagering platform between and among individuals located in any State that is party to such
compact.”).
148.
Lars A. Peterson, Note, The Winning Lineup: Framework for Federal Regulation of
Daily Fantasy Sports, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 745–46 (2019).
149.
See Juan Carlos Blanco, What Is the Net Effect of the New Wire Act Opinion on Sports
Betting?, THE LINES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.thelines.com/wire-act-sports-betting/
[https://perma.cc/M4FV-A9XL].
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Wire Act, specifically, whether the Court suggested that interstate
transmission of information (though still not bets themselves) is now
permissible.150 Nevertheless, for true market opportunities to open up
for sports betting entities, individuals around the country must be able
to access websites allowing them to place bets.
3. More Consumer Choice and Engagement
Federal regulation would allow citizens of certain states the
ability to enter a wider variety of bets—since lines and bets available
vary by the sportsbook151—and choose the companies they trust most.
Integrity issues caused by citizens betting on their own states’ sports
might become a concern, but this situation cannot be truly avoided.
Match fixers can easily access out-of-state sportsbooks to make bets,
whether by traveling or masking their IP addresses.152 As a result, there
seems to be no legitimate reason to restrict genuine fans and bettors
from having the choice to gamble on their local university’s team.
Additionally, as fans gain the opportunity to bet on more events
outside the areas they live, they will become more engaged in the
product. Sports betting, whether single-game or real-time “prop” bets
(bets placed on singular events during a game), will likely spur
increased engagement similar to what fantasy football encouraged.153
Research has shown that 64 percent of fantasy sports players watch

150.
Sam Shefrin, Everything We Know About the Interstate Wire Act of 1961, LINEUPS
(June 5, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://www.lineups.com/betting/everything-we-know-about-the-interstate-wire-act-of-1961/ [https://perma.cc/C469-HMZM].
151.
Chris Yuscavage, Everything You Need to Know About How Betting Lines Work,
COMPLEX (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.complex.com/sports/2015/01/how-betting-lines-work/
[https://perma.cc/VA7N-2LM5] (“Once upon a time, there weren’t many reputable sportsbooks out
there. So there was a lot more consistency from one sportsbook to the next. But today, there are so
many of them that it’s not uncommon for betting lines to differ from one sportsbook to the next.”);
see Marcus Mosher, NFL Prop Bets, BOOKIES.COM (Dec. 10, 2019), https://bookies.com/tips-andpicks/nfl-prop-bets [https://perma.cc/Y2FA-ACUA] (suggesting that new bettors look at multiple
sportsbooks before placing their first prop bet to find the best value since the available bets vary
from site to site).
152.
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LEGAL GAMBLING & THE L. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.legalgamblingandthelaw.com/blog/doesusing-a-vpn-help-you-gamble-in-a-restricted-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/RR8T-E37D] (“Online
gambling is restricted and outlawed in several countries across the world. However, in order to
actually enforce the restriction, ISPs go ahead and block websites depending on your IP
address/location. However, with right use of the right VPN, you can remotely access your favorite
online casino or casinos without any restrictions through some random server somewhere else in
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153.
Rise of Fantasy Football Played Big Part in League’s Growth, FANTASY
SPORTS & GAMING ASS’N (Sept. 2, 2019), https://thefsga.org/rise-of-fantasy-football-played-bigpart-in-leagues-growth/ [https://perma.cc/XEL6-QXXZ].
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more live sports because of their involvement in fantasy leagues or daily
fantasy, both of which have similarities to traditional sports betting.154
This number is likely to increase as fans get involved in sports betting,
which promises a lower time commitment but the same entertainment
value.155 Sports teams may be able to follow a European sports model
and provide sportsbooks in-stadium;156 while in-stadium sportsbooks
seem unimaginable in the current US sports culture, American leagues
are already mimicking English football by accepting official betting
partners and sponsors.157 An in-stadium sportsbook would help leagues
acquire a form of their long-sought-after integrity fees158 while
simultaneously drawing more attendance.
Overall, sports betting could provide consumers with more
choice in where and on what they bet. Additionally, fans who attend or
watch the games from home will be more likely to actively engage in the
sports product while placing single bets on the game, rather than the
season-long commitment of fantasy football.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION FOR INTERSTATE SPORTS GAMBLING
BUSINESSES AS A SOLUTION
The federal government should modify SWMIA both to avoid the
same traps that PASPA fell into and reflect the growing acceptance of
sports betting. Setting minimum standards for states to follow and
154.
Id.
155.
See Daniel Wallach, Player Unions Need to Engage on Sports Betting, and It’s Not Too
Late,
FORBES
(Apr.
8,
2018,
9:42PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielwallach/2018/04/08/player-unions-need-to-engage-on-sports-betting-and-its-not-toolate/#3b19a9155d23 [https://perma.cc/WGZ4-2ZXA] (“For the leagues, sports betting legalization
will drive fan engagement, which in turn will increase television ratings and the value of the
leagues’ media rights deals.”).
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Tariq Panja, Is Britain the Future of U.S. Sports Betting?, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/sports/sports-betting-england.html [https://perma.cc/XY7YN4XJ] (“Nine of the 20 soccer teams playing in the Premier League have names of gambling
companies emblazoned on their jersey fronts. . . . Inside the stadium, betting odds crawl across
advertising boards. Almost every Premier League soccer team has an official betting partner,
which in some cases is a multimillion-dollar relationship that includes betting booths inside the
stadium and dedicated websites.”).
157.
Irwin Raij, Jared F. Bartie & Alexander Chester, Legalized Sports Gambling: Revenue
Opportunities Following Murphy, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/client-alert-legalized-sports-gambling-revenue-opportunities-following-murphy/
[https://perma.cc/P4X9-8HHH];
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U.S.
Sportsbook and Casino Team Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sports-betting-deals/ [https://perma.cc/AE7R-ETDX] (last updated Mar. 28,
2019).
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Raij et al., supra note 157 (discussing the potential of monetization of in-stadium
betting through betting kiosks or phone applications).
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requesting that they apply for federal approval (as proposed by
SWMIA)159 treads too close to the anti-commandeering issues PASPA
faced; rather, a new federal law must solely focus on regulating and
controlling interstate-only gambling activity. Such a statute would need
to alter the Wire Act to permit interstate sports gambling; it is no longer
realistic to ignore the prevalence of the internet and its influence on
sports betting. The statute should not infringe on state gambling laws
except to allow those citizens to participate in federally regulated
activities.
Rather than requiring interstate compacts, a new law should
allow sports betting entities to operate exclusively online under
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Repealing the Wire Act and creating a
strict framework with higher standards (and penalties) for interstate
sportsbooks would help maintain integrity while generating more
revenue for businesses, the government, and the leagues.
The new statute would need to accomplish several goals: (1)
enact steeper penalties for violations, (2) command modification or
replacement of other sports gambling laws, (3) dictate revenue sharing
between the states and the federal government, (4) create an advisory
committee for the continued enforcement and support of states and
individual bettors, and (5) facilitate an open-market system for sports
data rather than mandate the use of official league data.
A. Steeper Penalties
A new law would necessitate creating steeper penalties for
violators of sports betting laws; such a statute would deter match fixing
by making it a federal crime. Steeper penalties would not discourage
honest bettors, primarily average sports fans, from engaging in
wagering; rather, it would disincentivize only those with the power to
alter the outcome of a bet from doing so. The necessity of steeper
penalties comes from individuals being able to utilize the anonymity of
the internet to harm the integrity of games or scam inexperienced
bettors. Without steeper, potentially criminal penalties, the same
characters who helped the offshore and underground sports betting
markets thrive during PASPA will likely continue in their own ways to
escape state penalties.160

159.
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. §§ 102(a)(1),
103(b).
160.
See Martin Derbyshire, Legal Sportsbooks Have to Dominate Illegal Ones and
Lawmakers Are Key, PLAY USA (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.playusa.com/lawmakers-sports-betting-market/ [https://perma.cc/94FH-UA5P].
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As proposed, SWMIA creates a blanket prohibition on accepting
sports wagers and creates exceptions for operators and individuals who
accept these wagers in accordance with state law.161 Any violators
would be subject to a fine of either up to $10,000 or three times the
amount of money wagered, whichever is greater.162 This fine is
sufficiently high, since a separate violation occurs for each sports wager
accepted.163 However, SWMIA fails to set a standard for when actions
become criminal, instead delegating the criminal penalties to the Wire
Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA).164 Both acts impose
fines; the Wire Act allows for imprisonment for up to two years and the
IGBA for up to five.165 For full deterrent power and clarity of law, the
new federal statute should instead expressly set its own criminal
penalties—for instance, an additional fine and up to five years in prison.
Under this structure, any one person who is operating an illegal
sportsbook will be threatened with a steeper penalty than what he or
she would be subject to under the Wire Act. Additionally, any
businesses that would have fallen under the IGBA’s discretion
would face explicit, high, designated fines and up to five years in
prison for each individual involved. Instituting penalties with
easy-to-comprehend consequences may create a better deterrence
mechanism.
B. Modification or Elimination of Existing Sports Gambling Laws
The Wire Act is perhaps the most substantial barrier to a federal
sports gambling framework.166 It is time to replace the Wire Act and
modify the Travel Act and Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act
in order to create a clean slate for new federal law. Stepping around a
patchwork of different gambling laws creates a situation in which
sports betting entities, leagues, and states are left unsure as to whether
or not an action is federally illegal. While scholars may enjoy a good
debate and analysis over the legality of certain actions, the individual
stakeholders will be much better off when they have a singular set of

161.
§ 101(a)–(b).
162.
Id. § 101(d)(1).
163.
Id. § 101(d)(2).
164.
18 U.S.C. § 1084; 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
165.
18 U.S.C. § 1084; 18 U.S.C. § 1955.
166.
See Tucker Davison, Case Note, Merging Sports Gambling and Technology: What’s
Really Going to Happen?, 22 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 165, 171–73 (2019).
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rules to follow.167 Clearly, drafting such a statute is a daunting task.168
However, Congress should not be dissuaded by the effort; the benefits
of taxation, consumer protection, and market liquidity outweigh the
costs of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing it.
C. State and Federal Revenue Sharing
Because the proposed law would be singularly focused on
interstate gambling, states would still be free to police entities within
their jurisdiction. This would allow states to primarily capitalize on
brick-and-mortar casinos or state-specific mobile sports betting
applications. Additionally, a new federal law should implement revenue
sharing with the states involved in each bet. A simple percentage of any
gambling revenue will be split with each state involved in the
transaction; for instance, if the sportsbook operating the interstate
application is housed in one state and the individual betting is a
resident of another, both states get a 3 percent share of revenue from
that bet. This would incentivize states to monitor the betting activity of
their citizens, which could lead to the exposure of more bad actors, such
as match-fixers or scammers—one of the primary benefits of the
legalization of any widespread illegal activity.
Alternatively, rather than taxing the entities or individuals who
receive the wagers (i.e., the sportsbooks), the state and federal
governments may rely on a system similar to the lottery. Here, the
states could tax the bets themselves by taking a percentage from the
sportsbooks’ revenues, and the federal government could capitalize on
individuals’ increased income taxes.169 But, if the federal government
opted for this type of revenue sharing and monetization, it may be
necessary to employ an additional federal tax on sportsbooks that
accept interstate wagers online in order to truly capitalize on the
industry.

167.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL, WHEN LAWS BECOME TOO
COMPLEX, 2013 (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/187015/GoodLaw_report_8April_AP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GA7YK23H].
168.
See Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 498–99 (1950).
169.
Amelia Josephson, The Economics of the Lottery, SMART ASSET (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://smartasset.com/taxes/the-economics-of-the-lottery [https://perma.cc/ZV55-2946].
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D. Oversight Committee for Addiction and Consistency
In this proposed federal law, it would be necessary to have a
committee that includes individuals from the leagues, players
associations, and other interested parties outside of the government to
make sure any concerns, such as funds for addiction treatment or
league and state revenue sharing percentages, are addressed directly
rather than merely lobbied for. This committee would remain in
existence after the bill passed to act as an advisor to whichever
governing body is assigned to monitor and enforce the new laws
surrounding interstate sports betting. One primary role of the
committee will be to act as a resource to individuals who struggle with
gambling addiction. The committee will be granted a percentage of
sports gambling revenues and utilize that revenue to provide
programming that educates and supports addicted individuals.
Additionally, the oversight committee would be empowered to
release guidance to the states to encourage uniformity. By having
access to some of the revenue from interstate sports gambling, the
committee would have the ability to conduct further research and
gather information on what state and federal systems are most
profitable and safe. Money and information would equip the committee
to create sensible standards that, while not requirements, would nudge
states into adopting more uniform laws nationwide.
The sticking point here, though, is participation from those
outside the federal government. It will be critical to encourage players,
league executives, sportsbook managers, and other third parties to send
representatives to serve on the committee. That being said, the leagues
and players associations have an interest in representing themselves
and lobbying for guidelines that are beneficial to the integrity of their
sports.170 Additionally, the players associations likely have an interest
in voicing their opinions regarding player images and likenesses.171
Similarly, the leagues may want to continue to push integrity fees or
mandated (or suggested) official data usage.172 Ideally, these parties,
the sportsbooks, and various sports economists, lawyers, and other
professionals will be able to find economically sound guidelines and
suggestions for the federal and state legislatures to follow.

170.
See King, supra note 84.
171.
See Irwin Raij, Murphy and Athletes’ Publicity Rights, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Oct.
31, 2018), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/murphy-and-athletespublicity-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q8FG-KDNY].
172.
Official League Data, supra note 89.
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E. Open-Market Data Usage
While some states opt for official data mandates, the federal
government would be wise to resist lobbying efforts and allow sports
betting entities to choose any data provider they trust. While official
league data may have some benefits, Nevada demonstrates those
benefits are not necessary to a successful sports betting regime.173
Rather than gifting a monopoly to the leagues,174 the committee under
the new federal law should research and set standards for the average
acceptable accuracy and speed of sports data for federally regulated
sportsbooks.
Additionally, not mandating official data usage will encourage
leagues to innovate and create new, valuable ways of collecting and
disseminating data. Matt King, CEO of daily fantasy company
FanDuel, does not currently find much appeal in official data for his
company besides using it as a tool to maintain FanDuel’s relationships
with different leagues.175 Once the leagues create a product that is truly
superior to the cheaper alternatives available to sportsbooks, the
leagues should be able to trust the market to adjust in their favor.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sports betting is not going anywhere. Whether it is legalized by
the states, by the federal government, or not at all, individuals will
continue to bet on sports teams and utilize this activity as a way to
engage with the game. Modification of SWMIA with the intention of
achieving uniformity for private, interstate actors while avoiding the
same constitutional issues PASPA faced would allow interstate sports
betting to thrive economically while also addressing negative societal
consequences. If the states, leagues, and, most critically, the federal
government can agree on a way to regulate interstate sports betting,
the benefits to all stakeholders will be enormous. Those with gambling
addictions may feel more comfortable seeking assistance as the activity
becomes normalized, and more resources can be expended to help those
individuals. Both state and federal governments will realize tax gains
from individuals switching from unreliable, offshore bookies to safer,
regulated sports betting. Finally, leagues will see increased fan
173.
Savannah Malnar, Legalized Sports Betting and the Pitfalls of an Official League Data
Mandate, JETLAW BLOG (Feb. 2, 2020) (on file with author).
174.
Smiley, supra note 121.
175.
Bill King, Sportsbooks Weigh Benefits of Official Data, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/04/15/In-Depth/Data.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q279-5JGX].
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engagement and viewership as fans begin to have a more cognizable
interest in a wider variety of games. If the federal government opts to
legalize interstate sports gambling, the odds are good it will be a winner
for all parties.
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